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Abstract
This paper investigates the financial market effects of recent cybercriminality in cryptocurrency
markets. Hacking events are found to increase both the price volatility of the targeted cryptocur-
rency and broad cross-cryptocurrency correlations. Further, cybercrime events significantly reduce
price discovery sourced within the hacked currency relative to other cryptocurrencies. Finally, ab-
normal returns in the hours prior to the cybercrime event, revert to zero when news is publicly
announced.
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1. Introduction
Cryptocurrencies have become popular because they enable efficient payment systems through
a decentralised distributed ledger, which does not depend on a political process or governmental
regulatory system. Our research attempts to develop our understanding of the widespread illicit
behaviour that has been witnessed in cryptocurrency markets. With access to the public’s cre-
dentials, hackers can steal electronic identities and move funds from legitimate accounts. Hackers
may engage in phishing attacks in which the hacker steals credentials by faking the appearance of
trustworthy sources. Hackers may further steal information through direct security breaches.
The continued evolution of cryptocurrencies and the underlying exchanges on which they trade
has generated tremendous urgency to develop our understanding of a product that has been iden-
tified as a potential enhancement of and replacement for traditional cash as we know it. Urquhart
[2016] was the first to examine the market efficiency of Bitcoin and found through a battery of tests
that Bitcoin was inefficient, although it was becoming less inefficient over time. Much research
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continues to identify this asset class to contain exceptionally high levels of volatility when com-
pared to more established counterparts (Corbet et al. [2019]). However, cryptocurrencies as a new
asset class is not without its substantial issues, particularly that of the provision of a platform for
criminality and, indeed, major cybercriminality events. While much debate surrounds the process
in which this product can be regulated, there exists a wide variety of channels in which criminality
can develop and thrive. Regulatory bodies and policy-makers alike have observed the growth of
cryptocurrencies with a certain amount of scepticism, based on this growing potential for illegality
and malpractice. Foley et al. [2019] estimate that around $76 billion of illegal activity per year in-
volve Bitcoin (46% of Bitcoin transactions). This is estimated to be in the same region of the U.S.
and European markets for illegal drugs, and is identified as ‘black e-commerce’. While the volatility
of cryptocurrency price returns has been studied, for example, by Chu et al. [2017] and Phillip et al.
[2018], the potential for market manipulation appears to have been broadly identified in cryptocur-
rency cross-correlations and market interdependencies. Griffins and Shams [2018] investigated as
to whether Tether influenced Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices to find that purchases with
Tether were timed following market downturns and resulted in significant increases in the price of
Bitcoin. Such research has fine-tuned the focus of regulators, policy-makers and academics alike,
broad trust in both cryptocurrencies and the exchanges on which they trade cannot be sustained
with such significant questions of abnormality remaining unanswered. Developing understanding
of these new products and how to mitigate cybercriminality and their illicit use is an exceptionally
important task in order to validate their further use and development.
2. Data
We utilise data from the Bitfinex exchange at an 60-minute frequency for the eight most liquid
cryptocurrencies throughout the period. The log return, rt = ln(Pt/Pt−1) is then estimated for
the period 1 September 2017 through midnight on 10 August 2018 for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin,
Ripple, Stellar, Monero, Cardano and Bitcoin Cash. We considered the use of higher frequency
data and even tick level data, however, the use of hourly data was found to be most effective from
a methodological standpoint. The selection of Bitfinex as a source eliminates such fears presented
by Alexander and Dakos [2019], who identified issues with data variation, widely dependent on the
selected supplier. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the selected cryptocurrencies. Stellar
is the most volatile cryptocurrency with a variance of 0.00045 and standard deviation of 0.02111.
The largest one hour loss occurred in the market for Bitcoin Cash (-23.91%), while the largest gain
occurred in the market for Stellar (+40.325%).
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
2
In Table 2 we have established a list of the seventeen largest cryptocurrency hacking events
between September 2017 and August 2018. The list of hacking events includes a broad number of
unique situations that targeted either the exchange on which cryptocurrencies trade, the blockchain
supporting a specific cryptocurrency, or indeed the wallets of cryptocurrency investors. We have
only included events that were determined as newsworthy if identified on mainstream broadsheet
news sources on the LexisNexis database, Eikon and Bloomberg. The largest estimated loss from
such cryptocurrency theft occurred on the 9th of April 2018 when an alleged online scam, reportedly
sourced in Vietnam, let to the generation of a false ICO led by the companies Ifan and Pincoin.
The two firms are alleged to have misled approximately 32,000 investors and to have stolen in the
region of $650 million.
3. Analysis
After completing multiple specification tests, we utilise a multivariate GARCH(1,1) methodol-
ogy (Bollerslev [1986]) to obtain volatility changes in the immediate aftermath of a major cyber-
crime incident relating to cryptocurrency markets. We mitigate international effects through the
inclusion of the returns of traditional financial products in the mean equation of the GARCH(1,1)
methodology of the following form:
Rt = a0 +
5∑
j=1
bjRt−j + b2£/$t + b3V IXt + b4Goldt + b5S&Pt + b6Oilt +
17∑
i=1
Di + εt (1)
εt|Ωt ∼ iidN(0, ht) (2)
ht = ω + α1ht−1 + β1u
2
t−1 (3)
Rt−j represents the lagged value of cryptocurrency returns, n hours beforeRt is observed. b2£/$t
represents the interaction between the selected cryptocurrency returns and £/$, while b3V IXt
represents the value of the VIX in the hour that the estimate Rt was observed. Finally, b5S&Pt
and b6Oil represent the relationship between cryptocurrency returns and the returns of the S&P500
and oil as measured through the West Texas Intermediate (WTI).
∑17
i=1Di is included to provide
a coefficient relating to the included dummy variables indicating cybercriminality.
The multivariate-GARCH methodology, of which our results are presented in Table 3, incorpo-
rates past information through lagged cryptocurrency returns. Further, Table 4 provides robustness
through the estimation of GARCH calculated volatility throughout the entire period in which we
can denote episodes of cybercriminality. We observe that lagged returns are significant in all of our
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investigated cryptocurrencies with the exception of Ethereum. The results indicate that there are
broad differences in the volatility responses of cryptocurrencies with evidence supporting significant
instability generated within attacks on exchanges and ICO-fraud, both of which can be observed to
be heavily dependent on perceptions of stability and financial safety. Any threat to such stability
is found to lead widespread responses across a large number of cryptocurrencies rather than at the
individual level. There is also evidence of cryptocurrency-specific volatility based on the market
that has been directly targeted by such cybercrime. Such evidence is identified in the market for
Bitcoin in hack 3 (+0.0033), hack 4 (-0.0031), hack 11 (-0.0027) and for Ethereum during hack 8
(0.0033).
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
Significant increases in the comovement and correlation of returns in traditional financial markets
have been widely observed in periods of sharp financial crises (Forbes and Rigobon [2002]; Baig
and Goldfajn [1999]). We utilise a DCC-GARCH methodology (Engle [2002]), to identify that
there are lower estimates identified for smaller capitalisation cryptocurrencies when compared to
the cross-correlations between their larger counterparts. This holds true not only for the dynamic
correlations between smaller cryptocurrencies themselves, but also for the relationships between
smaller and larger cryptocurrencies. Further, there is evidence of distinct phases of volatility that
can be firmly attributed to key cybercrime events such as the bankruptcy of Youbit, the hacking of
Nicehash and the scams relating to GainBitcoin and Ifan/Pincoin.
Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 about here
The combination of the above multivariate GARCH and DCC-GARCH analysis presents a num-
ber of interesting observations. Primarily, we can identify that there are sharp volatility responses in
cryptocurrency markets during cybercrime events, which appear to be rationally targeted at cryp-
tocurrencies directly involved and the broader sector of cryptocurrencies should the cybercrime
event be systemically damaging. This is particularly evident during cybercrime events relating to
theft directly based on wallets which proponents state is one of the key safety features of virtual
currencies, and attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges that trade multiple cryptocurrencies. Fur-
ther, we find evidence of broad comovement in cryptocurrency markets during periods of extreme
stress and severe reputational damage which supports the hypotheses that these relatively youthful
markets have developed to act somewhat similarly to traditional financial assets in time of crises.
We investigate changing dynamics in the information share and component share of price discov-
ery before and after hacking events. There are two standard measures of price discovery commonly
employed in the literature: the Hasbrouck [1995] Information Share (IS) and the Gonzalo and
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Granger [1995] Component Share (CS) approach. Hasbrouck [1995] demonstrates that the con-
tribution of a price series to price discovery (the ‘Information Share’) can be measured by the
proportion of the variance in the common efficient price innovations that is explained by innova-
tions in that price series. A concise explanation of the selected methodology is presented in Corbet
et al. [2018]. We present evidence of the changing components of price discovery in Figures 2 and
3, which portray heat-maps representing the information share, the information leadership share
and the component share of price discovery respectively.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
These distinct differences in our information measures are of particular interest; information
share demonstrates the contribution of a price series to price discovery which can be measured
by the proportion of the variance in the common efficient price innovations while the component
share presents the permanent and temporary components of price discovery, therefore the common
efficient price and the efficient price caused by trading fractions. There is evidence to suggest
that cybercriminality can distort these pricing relationships and can also influence large and small
cryptocurrencies in a different manner. There is further evidence of differing responses based on
the size of the cryptocurrencies analysed during hacks relating to cybercrime fraud. One of the
most interesting results surrounds that of hack 2, relating to the theft of almost $431 million in
the cryptocurrency Tether on the 21st of November 2017 where an attacker had stolen the funds
directly from the Treasury wallet and subsequently moved them to an unauthorised account. While
analysing this event, we must consider the work of Gandal et al. [2018] who identified the impact
of suspicious trading activity on the Mt.Gox Bitcoin exchange theft when approximately 600,000
Bitcoins were attained. The authors demonstrated that the suspicious trading likely caused the
spike in price in late 2013 from $150 to $1,000, most likely driven by one single actor.
With regards to cybercriminality based on the hacking of the exchanges on which cryptocurren-
cies trade, hack 3 and 4 related to the breaches at NiceHash and Youbit respectively. The scale of
these cybercrime events resulted in widespread news coverage and despite little evidence of direct
pricing volatility, there is substantial evidence of net transfer of information from smaller to larger
cryptocurrencies through all three measures analysed, with particularly pronounced results evident
in the the component share of information. The scale of this event appears to have provided some-
what of an informational equilibrium between large and small cryptocurrencies alike, as the shock
echoed through the entire cryptocurrency sector. The distinct characteristics related to each cy-
bercrime appears to have generated substantial reverberations within cryptocurrency markets due
to the nature of the cybercrime event. While proponents of the new financial asset class continued
to identify the safety of it’s use as key feature of cryptocurrencies, these particular events exposed
deep flaws within their structure and supported the argument against their credibility due to the
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ease in which assets could be stolen. These events all generate substantial flows of information
through all measures from smaller cryptocurrencies to largest cryptocurrencies.
Insert Figure 4 about here
In Figure 4, we analyse the abnormal returns associated with each of the investigated hacking
events. For brevity, we have only included the stated hacks. We find evidence of abnormal returns
associated with the hacks of between -2% to -24%, depending on the specific event. The abnormal
returns are observed 4 hours prior to the actual hacking event and revert back to zero at the time
and announcement of the hack. While the role of automated trading programs warrants particular
investigation in these scenarios, we cannot eliminate the role of illicit behaviour as cryptocurrency
markets absorb the broadly damaging news of such significant cybercrime events.
4. Conclusion
This research provides a number of novel findings related to our selected cryptocurrency markets.
Primarily, there are significant differences identified in the volatility responses of cryptocurrencies
to attacks on exchanges and ICO-fraud, both of which can be heavily dependent on perceptions
of stability and financial safety. In a DCC-GARCH analysis, we observe that there are lower
volatility estimates identified for smaller capitalisation cryptocurrencies when compared to the
cross-correlations between their larger counterparts. We identify the largest sustained increase in
cross-cryptocurrency correlations between the 6th of December 2017 and the 13th of January 2018,
incorporating a number of significant hacks in our sample. Peak cross-correlations occur on the 18th
of December 2017, indicative of a substantial loss of confidence in the cryptocurrency market during
this time due to sustained internationally relayed coverage of multiple significant cybercrime events.
The second distinct phase of elevated cross-correlations occurs during the period between the 4th
of March 2018 and the 9th of April 2018 which represent the theft of approximately $300 million
during the multi-level-marketing scheme created by GainBitcoin and the ICO scam inspired by
Ifan and Pincoin that resulted in the loss of $650 million. Two distinct novel results are presented:
1) we find evidence of broad comovement in cryptocurrency markets during periods of extreme
stress and severe reputational damage; and 2) these same relationships change substantially in
the period after cryptocurrency cybercriminality, indicating that not only is the price volatility of
these financial products directly influenced, but also the manner in which the information share,
information leadership share and the component share of the price discovery is processed.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the traditional financial assets and cryptocurrencies
Count Mean Variance Std Dev Skew Kurt Min Max
Bitcoin 8,297 0.00011 0.00014 0.01195 0.48299 10.40750 -0.10547 0.11889
Ethereum 8,297 0.00007 0.00018 0.01352 0.85312 15.16250 -0.10905 0.15243
Litecoin 8,297 0.00011 0.00027 0.01657 1.48860 20.91631 -0.12945 0.23656
Ripple 8,297 0.00020 0.00038 0.01954 2.37126 34.32370 -0.16514 0.30347
Stellar 8,297 0.00046 0.00045 0.02111 2.99377 47.85589 -0.14332 0.40325
Monero 8,297 0.00010 0.00029 0.01713 0.34831 8.26498 -0.12667 0.18751
Bitcoin Cash 8,297 0.00019 0.00039 0.01981 0.69729 16.24494 -0.23913 0.27164
Cardano 7,376 0.00035 0.00035 0.01859 2.44642 30.14793 -0.17087 0.31692
Note: Our selected cryptocurrencies represent the eight largest by market capitalisation during the period in which data
was collected, sampled at 60-minute intervals, for the period from midnight on 1 September 2017 through midnight on 10
August 2018.
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Table 2: Cryptocurrency hacking events used to investigate the differences in price volatility and discover
Hack Date Time Amount Market Description
1 07-Nov-17 11:51 $280.0m Ethereum A user playing with the Parity multisig wallet library con-
tract triggered its kill function, effectively freezing the
funds.
2 21-Nov-17 04:15 $30.0m Tether Tether stated that $30,950,010 USDT was sent to an
unauthorized bitcoin address.
3 06-Dec-17 10:45 $64.0m Bitcoin Service breach and hack at NiceHash.
4 18-Dec-17 21:35 $37.0m Bitcoin A message on Youbit’s official website stated that, at
around 4:34 a.m. local time, an external hack resulted
in the loss of ‘about 17 % of total assets.’
5 13-Jan-18 12:00 $0.4m Stellar A DNS hijack has led to hackers withdrawing $400,000
worth of Stellar Lumen (XLM) coins from wallets hosted
by Blackwallet.co without user permission.
6 26-Jan-18 15:00 $532.6m NEM On 26 Jan, Coincheck suspended all deposits in NEM on
their exchange.
7 31-Jan-18 20:22 $0.9m BeeToken Cryptocurrency startup BeeToken was hacked while the
attackers targeted its ICO with phishing attacks.
8 05-Feb-18 17:00 $1.8m Ethereum Potential Seele ICO investors were scammed out of nearly
$2 million by impersonators posing as administrators.
9 08-Feb-18 12:00 $195.0m Nano Exchange hack.
10 15-Feb-18 09:00 $50.0m Bitcoin A large scam had netted $50 million in cryptocurrency
over a three-year period.
11 04-Mar-18 17:41 $50.0m Bitcoin BTC Global was a scam launched in September 2017 by
‘famous’ trader Steven Twain.
12 05-Apr-18 12:00 $300.0m Bitcoin GainBitcoin began as a multi-level marketing (MLM)
scheme in 2015 and amassed over 100,000 investors, all
of whom were promised monthly returns of 10% on their
investment.
13 09-Apr-18 12:00 $650.0m ICO Occurring in Vietnam, the largest alleged scam connected
to an ICO has been pulled off by two blockchain firms,
Ifan and Pincoin.
14 19-Apr-18 09:00 $20.0m Bitcoin Two men started the scheme in 2015 and subsequently
built a multi-level company by promising investors high
returns through investing in bitcoin. ‘
15 10-Jun-18 17:00 $40.0m NPXS Coinrail stated that it had suspended services after ERC-
20 based tokens were stolen from the platform.
16 16-Jun-18 07:33 $31.5m Ethereum Bithumb moved a large amount of Ethereum to its cold
wallet when they recently noticed abnormal access.
17 09-Jul-18 21:35 $23.5m Ethereum Bancor experienced a security breach to the hot wallet
used to update smart contracts on its exchange, result-
ing in a loss of approximately $23.5 million worth of
Ethereum.
In the above table we have established a list of seventeen of the largest cryptocurrency hacking events between September
2017 and August 2018.
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Table 3: Multivariate GARCH methodology analysing cryptocurrency response to hacking events
Variable Bitcoin Ethereum Litecoin Ripple Stellar Monero Bit. Cash Cardano
R1 -0.1896*** -0.0447 -0.0558** -0.1736*** -0.2628*** -0.1499*** -0.0060 -0.2760***
(-4.21) (-1.74) -2.39 -8.44 -6.48 -5.06 -0.27 -8.84
R2 -0.0488 -0.0131 -0.0727*** -0.2037*** 0.0345 -0.0137 -0.0504** -0.0709*
(-1.57) (-0.62) -3.67 -10.14 1.17 -0.44 -2.11 -1.72
R3 0.0460 -0.0059 -0.0472* 0.0579** -0.1813*** 0.0774*** -0.0216 0.0761**
(1.52) (-0.24) -1.91 2.44 -11.08 2.86 -0.88 2.11
R4 -0.0930*** -0.0168 -0.0656*** -0.0092 -0.0393* -0.0192 -0.0063 -0.0828***
(-3.34) (-0.86) -4.02 -0.40 -1.78 -0.74 -0.25 -3.03
R5 -0.0103 -0.0192 -0.0283 -0.0217 -0.1823*** -0.0653** -0.0341 -0.0078
(-0.42) (-0.95) -1.43 -0.98 -9.04 -2.40 -1.62 -0.25
GBP/USD 0.2395 -0.4719 0.2629 0.7008 -0.2349*** 0.0365 -0.7563 -0.1159
(0.38) (-1.23) 0.52 0.75 -3.89 0.05 -1.00 -0.09
VIX 0.0152 -0.0122 -0.0177 0.0141 0.0191 0.0153 0.0109 0.0237
(0.88) (-0.75) -1.00 0.61 0.88 0.92 0.48 0.96
Gold 0.2286 -0.1741 -0.0458 0.3451 -0.5614* -0.0373 -0.6397* 0.0896
(0.67) (-0.68) -0.20 0.83 -1.78 -0.11 -1.91 0.16
S&P500 0.1595 0.0130 0.2417 0.4752 0.1625 0.1028 -0.0808 0.1235
(0.56) (0.06) 1.01 1.24 0.56 0.36 -0.23 0.39
Oil -0.1174 -0.0506 -0.0124 -0.1537 -0.2540* 0.1124 0.1365 0.3203*
(-1.04) (-0.60) -0.16 -1.08 -1.71 0.90 0.96 1.73
D1 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0016 0.0007 0.0011 0.0030* 0.0023 0.0019
(-1.60) (0.92) 1.22 0.42 0.38 1.90 1.53 1.54
D2 -0.0005 -0.0015*** -0.0006 -0.0012 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004
(-0.67) (-4.19) -0.63 -1.20 0.43 -0.27 0.12 -0.43
D3 0.0033*** -0.0021*** -0.0013 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0003
(2.89) (-2.54) -1.32 1.02 0.04 -0.18 -0.70 0.13
D4 -0.0031*** -0.0016 -0.0010 0.0023 0.0053*** -0.0068*** -0.0051** -0.0002
(-2.62) (-1.59) -0.49 1.43 2.59 -6.52 -2.38 -0.16
D5 -0.0020* -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0033* -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0030* -0.0009
(-1.69) (-1.02) -1.33 -1.68 -0.83 -0.50 -1.90 -0.60
D6 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0006
(-0.98) (0.50) -0.13 -0.17 -1.13 -0.68 -0.23 -0.65
D7 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0032*** 0.0106*** 0.0056*** -0.0011 -0.0016 0.0019**
(-0.83) (-0.27) 2.47 17.34 9.23 -0.76 -1.17 2.41
D8 0.0025 0.0033* 0.0029 0.0042*** 0.0010 0.0053** 0.0054** 0.0011
(1.37) (1.91) 1.38 2.49 0.87 2.31 2.39 0.90
D9 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0006
(-0.26) (-0.71) -0.11 0.39 0.05 -0.69 -0.44 -0.50
D10 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0020*** -0.0004 0.0021 0.0028*** -0.0002
(0.87) (0.29) -0.19 2.77 -0.44 1.61 2.75 -0.44
D11 -0.0027*** -0.0018** -0.0012 -0.0041*** 0.0017** -0.0028*** -0.0020** -0.0010
(-6.74) (-2.33) -1.41 -4.72 2.50 -3.18 -2.09 -0.98
D12 -0.0005 0.0010 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0009
(-0.86) (0.99) 0.00 0.05 0.31 -0.62 -0.19 1.08
D13 0.0091*** 0.0017* 0.0009 0.0013 0.0011 0.0010 0.0016 0.0008
(4.52) (1.65) 0.95 0.67 1.19 0.81 1.27 1.50
D14 0.0008 0.0020* 0.0011 0.0018 0.0000 0.0027** 0.0065*** 0.0000
(1.13) (1.91) 1.08 1.22 -0.03 2.12 5.19 -0.01
D15 -0.0023*** -0.0021** -0.0023** -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0053*** -0.0015 0.0016***
(-4.68) (-2.36) -2.63 -0.50 0.10 -8.39 -1.04 2.68
D16 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.25) (0.50) 0.25 -0.09 -0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.50
D17 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0099*** -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0101***
(-1.17) (-0.67) -0.28 -0.39 50.18 -1.08 -0.42 52.61
ARCH 0.0600*** 0.1160*** 0.1122*** 0.1922*** 0.1039*** 0.0882*** 0.0960*** 0.1693***
(38.31) (27.26) 33.59 44.28 50.27 26.06 28.32 36.53
GARCH 0.9287*** 0.8457*** 0.8682*** 0.7401*** 0.8927*** 0.9025*** 0.8803*** 0.8273***
(547.03) (166.53) 244.46 126.58 447.46 265.69 211.51 207.79
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Multivariate GARCH methodology using a continuous variable representing cryptocurrency cybercriminality
Variable Bitcoin Ethereum Litecoin Ripple Stellar Monero Bit. Cash Cardano
GBP/USD 0.2603 -0.4136 0.1857 0.7232 -0.3563*** -0.0840 -0.6414 -0.1867
(0.48) (-1.08) (0.38) (0.80) (-6.40) (-0.11) (-0.86) (-0.14)
VIX 0.0243 -0.0121 -0.0087 0.0406 0.0246 0.0019 0.0196 0.0224
(1.36) (-0.74) (-0.45) (1.45) (1.03) (0.09) (0.89) (0.68)
Gold 0.3161 -0.1161 -0.1151 0.1236 -1.6722*** -0.0055 -0.6468** -0.1227
(1.17) (-0.50) (-0.64) (0.30) (-4.82) (-0.02) (-2.01) (-0.19)
S&P500 0.1495 0.0204 0.2712 0.3528 0.1936 0.1635 0.0368 0.3369
(0.52) (0.10) (1.02) (0.94) (0.64) (0.47) (0.10) (0.94)
Oil -0.0817 -0.0510 0.0233 0.1251 -0.3224*** 0.0667 0.1202 0.0385
(-0.79) (-0.63) (0.31) (0.73) (-1.89) (0.45) (0.86) (0.28)
Volatility Change 1.3916*** 0.4297 1.2624*** 3.2872** 1.2265* 1.4947*** 0.8512 0.7668
(5.22) (0.66) (3.40) (2.29) (1.87) (8.82) (1.52) (0.15)
ARCH 0.2924*** 0.1879*** 0.2309*** 0.4030*** 0.2846*** 0.2607*** 0.3532*** 0.4629***
(4.35) (8.15) (7.32) (18.43) (8.55) (2.64) (7.79) (6.13)
GARCH 0.5062*** 0.7866*** 0.7598*** 0.5845*** 0.9218*** 0.4477*** 0.6280*** 0.5750***
(7.50) (9.84) (10.92) (13.91) (13.75) (4.42) (7.54) (10.45)
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Dynamic correlations between selected cryptocurrency markets during hacking events
ET-BT LT-BT RI-BT ST-BT MO-BT Bc-BT LT-ET RI-ET ST-ET MO-ET Bc-ET RI-LT ST-LT
Total 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
D1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
D2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
D3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03
D4 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.33 0.13
D5 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.11
D6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
D7 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04
D8 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00
D9 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
D10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
D11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00
D12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
D13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00
D14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
D15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
D16 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
D17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
MO-LT Bc-LT CA-LT ST-RI MO-RI Bc-RI CA-RI MO-ST Bc-ST CA-ST Bc-MO CA-MO CA-Bc
Total 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
D1 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
D3 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02
D4 0.25 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.02
D5 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.03
D6 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
D7 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
D8 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
D9 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
D10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
D11 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
D12 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
D13 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
D14 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
D15 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
D16 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
D17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01
Note: Results are scaled for presentation purposes by multiplying original coefficients by 102. For brevity we have only included selected abnormal return
results. All other results related to the abnormal returns of cryptocurrencies due to hacking events are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 1: Selected dynamic correlations between cryptocurrencies during cybercrime events
Note: For brevity we have only included selected dynamic correlation results. All other results related to the abnormal
returns of cryptocurrencies due to hacking events are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 2: Change in Information Share (IS) between cryptocurrencies in the period after a hacking event
Note: The above figure represents the change in the information share of price discovery in the period before each of the hacking events.
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Figure 3: Change in Information Leadership Share (ILS) between cryptocurrencies in the period after a hacking event
Note: The above figure represents the change in the information leadership share of price discovery in the period before each of the hacking events.
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Figure 4: Abnormal cryptocurrency returns in the period after each denoted hacking event
Note: The above figure represents the abnormal returns of our selected cryptocurrencies during the 24 hours periods both before and after major
cryptocurrency hacking events. For brevity we have only included selected abnormal return results. All other results related to the abnormal returns of
cryptocurrencies due to hacking events are available from the authors on request.
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